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Solidarity, Transfers, and Poverty
Antonia Díaz and Cristina Echevarria*
Abstract
There is abundant evidence that inter-vivos transfers are more important in low-income countries than in
industrialized countries. The authors use a new specification of altruism to explain this stylized fact. Under
this specification, individuals feel altruistically towards other individuals genetically related to them.
However, they worry about them only when their relatives’ consumption falls below a certain level.
Simulation results mimic the stylized facts concerning the relation between inter-vivos transfers and income.
1. Introduction
In this paper we propose a new definition of altruism that we consider most appro-
priate to study inter-vivos transfers. In our framework, an individual worries about a
specific relative only if this relative’s consumption falls below a certain threshold and
assuming that her own consumption is above this threshold. We use this specification
to explain some stylized facts concerning the relation between inter-vivos transfers and
income: namely, the fact that inter-vivos transfers are much more important in 
low-income countries than in industrialized countries, and the evidence gathered in
Cox et al. (1996) which shows that, within a country, altruism is mainly operative at
low levels of income.
We classify transfers as either inter-vivos or bequest-type. We take the stand that
some inter-vivos transfers (dowries or investment on human capital) should be con-
sidered as early bequests. Bequest-type transfers and inter-vivos transfers respond to
two different needs. While the first are meant to improve the recipients’ welfare in the
future, the second are meant to help the recipients change a present unpleasant situ-
ation. Bequest recipients are usually descendants, whereas inter-vivos transfer recipi-
ents are not necessarily so.1 This paper focuses on the last type of transfers.
The economic literature on inter/intra-family transfers began with Becker (1974).
The key feature of Becker’s altruism model is that the utility of the agent is related to
the utility of the descendants, and it is assumed that the agent cares more for his chil-
dren than his grandchildren, more for his grandchildren than his great-grandchildren,
and so on. In his framework, altruistic transfers have the effect that consumption of
each member of the spending unit is independent of the distribution of income across
unit members.
Individuals feel altruistically not only towards their descendants, but also towards
other individuals genetically related to them.2 However, it is clear that we do not feel
in the same way towards other relatives as towards our children. Our concept of 
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altruism differs from Becker’s in that individuals become concerned about their rela-
tives only if their relatives’ consumption falls below a certain level (a poverty line or
subsistence minimum). As a consequence, transfers among members of families in
which all members have an income above the threshold level are not seen. Thus, while
our concept of altruism is more restrictive than Becker’s, it can be used to analyze
altruism towards non-descendants. Although Becker’s concept seems adequate to
analyze bequests and anticipated bequests, it does not seem suitable to analyze inter-
vivos transfers purely directed to help out relatives in distress. Our formulation seems
better fitted to analyze this last type of transfers. Thus, this formulation of altruism is
complementary to the most standard one.
2. A Review of the Empirical Evidence
Our formulation accounts for the three following regularities concerning inter-vivos
transfers:
1. Within a country, altruistically motivated transfers are much more important at low
levels of income than at high levels of income. Good evidence concerning this regular-
ity is hard to find. The best evidence is gathered in Cox et al. (1996). As they explain,
the reason why evidence is hard to find in developed countries is because substantial
public transfers may have already crowded out private transfers to a large extent. Using
Filipino data, they test a generalized model of private transfers which encompasses
both the altruist hypothesis and the exchange motives for transfers. They conclude: “If
recipients are poor, altruistic motives are likely to be operative, . . . But once recipient
incomes rise above a certain threshold, non-altruistic transfer motives are effective at
the margin.” The sample is split between urban and rural households, considered sepa-
rately because of the large difference in standards of living. The threshold is estimated
at 15,272 Filipino pesos for urban households, equivalent to 26% of average urban
household income; and at 10,078 pesos for rural households, or 40% of average rural
income. However, 15,272 pesos corresponds to the 16th urban sample income quantile
and 10,078 pesos corresponds to the 18th rural sample income quantile; so the thresh-
olds are very similar in terms of the relevant income distributions. In 1999, the urban
threshold corresponded roughly to the Filipino poverty level.
2. The number of inter-vivos transfers, either in cash or in kind, is larger in low-income
countries than in industrialized countries. Table 1 in Cox and Jimenez (1990) lists infor-
mation on private transfers for several countries. Neither the definition of transfers nor
the segment of the population sampled are strictly comparable, but their table illus-
trates the difference. If we attend to the number of transfers, among a sample of urban
poor in El Salvador, 33% reported having received private transfers; 93% of a rural
south Indian sample received transfers from other households; and 47% of a sample
of Filipino households received private cash transfers. In contrast, only 15% of the
sample of US households received private transfers.
3. The amount of inter-vivos transfers, in relative terms, is larger in low-income coun-
tries than in industrialized countries. Table 1 in Cox and Jimenez (1990) shows that the
average transfer represented 11% of the average household income in the Salvadorean
sample; 20% in a sample of urban households in Java (Indonesia); but only 1% in the
US sample.
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3. The Model
Let us start by assuming that our extended family has two individuals, whom we call
mother and daughter for the sake of exposition. Individuals should be understood as
households, possibly comprising young children. Logarithmic preferences are used
across this paper to illustrate some points. We assume a static environment. We can
think of household i as the household of the mother and j as that of the daughter. The
mother derives utility from her own consumption, according to the function u(.), and
from her daughter’s utility. However, the satisfaction the mother obtains by a daugh-
ter’s increase in consumption is bounded. We model this idea in the following way.
There exists a threshold consumption level, , above which the mother does not obtain
higher utility from her daughter’s increasing wellbeing. Likewise, the mother does not
care about her daughter if her own consumption falls below the level cs. Thus, the
mother’s utility is described in the following way:
where the function V is
The parameter b can be interpreted in the usual way: it is an altruism factor whose
value lies in the interval (0, 1). is the level above which an increase in the daughter’s
wellbeing does not increase the mother’s utility; in some sense, it should be understood
as the consumption level above which the extended family as a source of insurance
disappears. cs is the consumption level below which the mother cares only about her
own wellbeing: these two points do not need to be the same, but we assume that they
are the same for simplicity. Thus, we assume
We will refer to the threshold level, cs, as the subsistence consumption, just for conve-
nience, but it should not be understood as the agent dying if her consumption falls
below this level. Our results carry through when assuming π cs.
Let us denote as Ii the income (endowment of the consumption good) of the mother
and Ij as that of the daughter. There are three possible cases: both incomes are above
the subsistence level, both incomes are below the subsistence level, or only one income
falls below this level. In the first case, there are no transfers because there is no need
for help.
In the third case, if the mother is the one whose income is above the subsistence
level, the mother solves the following problem:
(Likewise, if the daughter is the one whose income is above this level.) With logarith-
mic preferences, the transfer will be
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Notice that not only the amount but also the pattern of the transfer varies with the
individuals’ levels of income.
A Generalization: Efficient Allocations
The framework described above can be generalized to model an extended family 
composed of more than two households. A natural generalization of our specification
of altruistic preferences to this case is
b is raised to the power dij, where dij is the degree of kinship between agents i and j.
Relatives of first degree are parents, children, and siblings. Relatives of second degree
are grandparents, aunts and uncles, grandchildren, and nieces and nephews. Cousins
are third-degree relatives. Thus, the way in which the agent discounts her relative’s
utility is based on biologists’ Hamilton’s rule.3
For convenience of exposition, in this section we consider a family of three members.
Then the agent’s utility is
There may be a situation in which all agents’ incomes are above the subsistence
level; another in which all incomes are below the subsistence level; a third in which
only one relative’s income is above this level; and the last in which one relative’s
income is below this level. In the first two cases each individual consumes his income.
In the third case, assume that the relative whose income is above the subsistence level
is the one labeled i. The problem that she solves is
(1)
If (1 + bdil + bdik)cs < Ii + Il + Ik, individual i’s consumption is above cs and the solution
to the problem satisfies the constraints and the first-order conditions
where
If (1 + bdil + bdik)cs  Ii + Il + Ik, the person whose income is above the subsistence level
consumes the subsistence level, and the other two consume
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(an amount below cs), provided that these quantities are greater than income for both
of them. Otherwise, they consume their own income. For individual i’s to transfer some
income, it needs to be that
(2)
i.e., in almost all cases, she transfers income. If she does not, it is either because her
degree of altruism is very low or because her income, although greater than cs, is very
close to her relatives’ income.
In the fourth case, let us assume that the two relatives with incomes above the 
subsistence level are those labeled l and k and that individual i’s income is below 
the subsistence level. When there are two or more individuals able to help the person
in need, the question arises of how poor relatives are helped. Cooperation seems
natural in our environment. Furthermore, we assume that there is no private infor-
mation within the family: each member’s income is observable by the rest of the family.
We take the view that relatives have a good idea of all members’ income. This elimi-
nates the possibility of strategic behavior.
Since all agents with income above subsistence level care about the level of con-
sumption of the poor relative, consumption of the poor relative is a public good. As in
many public-good problems, the amount of public good to be provided (level of con-
sumption of the poor relative) and the distribution of the cost of this consumption
among the two other relatives need to be solved. To solve this public-good problem,
we follow an efficiency approach similar to the one used by Chiappori (1992). The idea
underlying this approach is the following. Relatives whose income is above the sub-
sistence level engage in cooperative bargaining to decide the amount transferred to
the poor relative. Any allocation resulting from this process is Pareto-efficient and,
thus, there exist weights al and ak (al + ak = 1) such that the solution to the bargain-
ing is a solution to the following problem:
(3)
With logarithmic preferences, the constraints and the following set of inequalities
(4)
characterize the efficient solutions if
(5)
If the poor relative receives less than the subsistence minimum, a solution is charac-
terized by the following relation:
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and transfers are proportional to the weights a. If the poor relative receives the sub-
sistence minimum, transfers are also proportional to the weights a.
If the inequality shown in expression (5) is reversed for one of the two individuals
whose income is above the subsistence level, let us say j = l, this person consumes cs
and transfers her remaining income to the poor relative. Then the other individual
whose income is above the subsistence level, j = k, transfers the following amount:
In almost all cases, both relatives help the relative in distress. Analytically, they both
help if the following set of (sufficient) conditions is satisfied:
(6)
(7)
Expression (6) has the same interpretations as expression (2). Expression (7) says
that, in the case of very disparate incomes, one of them may not help.
Given the weights a, this efficiency approach results in an allocation rule that is
tractable, anonymous, and efficient by construction. As explained above, any set of a
characterizes one of the possible solutions to the underlying bargaining in which the
family engage.
4. Results and Discussion
Of the four results presented here, the first and the third are analytical. The other two
are derived with the aid of computer simulations.
Family Income and Transfers
In this subsection we study how, according to our model, inter-vivos transfers vary with
income across families within the same country. We show that, under certain assump-
tions about distribution of income and intergenerational correlation of income, our
model predicts that, inside a country, both the number and the amount of inter-vivos
transfers inside a family are inversely correlated with family income.
Suppose that each family is composed of a grandparent, who has N children, who in
turn have N children. Therefore, the family has 1 + N + N 2 members and each member
worries about N + N2 relatives. That the first and the second generation have the same
number of children is not essential in any way.
This is a static model and usually three generations coexist at the same point in time.
Income of a member g of the first generation is denoted Ig, and I is the average income
for this generation. The members of the second generation have an income dependent
on their parents’ income and an idiosyncratic shock. Income of a member p of this
generation is Ip. Income of a member c of the third generation is Ic, which also depends
on the parents’ income and a shock.
If the intergenerational correlation of income is high enough and the distribution of
the shock is symmetric of mean zero, each generation has an income distribution
similar to the previous one and so does the aggregation of the three generations.
However, according to Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), the correlation between
parents’ and children’s income, as deviation from the mean of their generation, in the
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US economy is roughly 0.4. Although this correlation is probably higher in less-
developed countries, this means that, in general, to preserve an income distribution
similar to a Lorenz curve a shock that is skewed is needed; i.e., if your parents enjoy
a high income, the probability of becoming richer than your parents is lower than that
of becoming poorer than them—there exists regression to the mean. In this paper we
assume a uniform distribution of the shock, e ~ u(0, 2s), but then, and to preserve the
income distribution, we assume that an individual income depends also on average
income I. Thus:
In this way, there is regression to the mean as well.
Average family income and expected number of transfers. Suppose the income of the
grandparent is Ig. Expected average family income is then
which is equal to Ig when r = 1. Since there is a simple relation between expected 
family income and grandparent’s income, and since it is easier to relate expected
number of transfers to grandparent’s income rather than to expected family income,
we do so.
The probability Fp(Ig) of a member of the second generation being poor is
or
If the distribution function of e is f (e), then
With this uniform distribution:
Then, the probability of m members of the second generation being poor is a binomial
function
So the expected number of poor persons in the second generation is NFp(Ig).
The conditional probability of a member of the third generation being poor, given
the parent shock ep ∫ P(Ic  cs|ep), is
e e e
r r re
p c c
c I I
f d
s g p
= ( )
-•
- - -( ) -
Ú ,
2 21
N
m
I Ip g
m
p g
N mÊ
ËÁ
ˆ
¯˜ ( )( ) - ( )( )
-F F1 .
Fp g
s gI
c I I( ) = - - -( ) +ÏÌ
Ó
¸
˝
˛
Ï
Ì
Ó
¸
˝
˛
min max , , .
r r s
s
1
2
0  1
F p g
c I I
I f d
s g( ) = ( )
-•
- - -( )
Ú e e
r r
.
1
F p g s gI P c I I( ) = ( ) - - -( )e r r 1 .
F p g g sI P I I c( ) = + -( ) +( )r r e1  ,
I Ig 1 2
3
2 2+ +( ) + - -( )r r r r
,
I I Ic p= + -( ) +r r e1 .
I I Ip g= + -( ) +r r e1 ,
 
    7
where ec is the shock for the third generation. Therefore, the probability of a member
of the third generation being poor is
With the proposed uniform distribution:
Thus, the probability of m members of the third generation being poor is the binomial
function
The expected number of poor people in the third generation is N 2Fc(Ig).
The expected number of poor relatives, Enp, inside a family, given the grandparent’s
income, is
(8)
The expected number of poor relatives depends positively on the number of members
in each generation and on the subsistence level, and negatively on grandparent’s in-
come. It depends positively on the degree of correlation r if the grandparent’s income
is below the mean and negatively otherwise.
The effect of changes in the standard deviation depends on the level of grandparent’s
income relative to the difference between the subsistence level and a certain propor-
tion of income per capita. If the grandparent’s income is low enough, an increase in
volatility can only increase the number of individuals whose income is above the sub-
sistence level. Likewise, if the grandparent’s income is sufficiently high, an increase in
volatility increases the expected number of poor relatives. Since the effect depends on
the difference between the subsistence level and a proportion of income per capita, if
the latter is high enough the expected number of poor relatives increases (or does not
change) with volatility for any level of grandparent’s income.
Assuming that all relatives whose income is above the subsistence level transfer
some income to those whose income is below this level, the expected number of 
transfers is
The expected number of transfers is maximized at the level of income Ig that satisfies
The function Enp(Ig) is strictly decreasing and, assuming that cs  s :
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The condition cs  s is sufficient but not necessary. As we will see, s is likely to be
greater than cs. Therefore, the expected number of transfers inside a family is 
maximized when
i.e., when Ig is at or below the subsistence level. That the number of transfers is 
maximized around the subsistence level is intuitive, since the number of transfers 
is maximized when half of the family members have an income above and half of them
have an income below the subsistence level. This is most likely to occur when the
grandparent’s income is around the subsistence level. This result is independent 
of the income distribution across members of the first generation.
Result 1. Within a country, the expected number of transfers inside a family is maxi-
mized when the grandparent’s income is at or below the subsistence level.
Now, in most countries, families at the subsistence level belong to the lowest quan-
tiles of the income distribution. Thus, generally speaking, within a country, the number
of altruistically motivated transfers is larger at low income levels than at high income
levels.
Average family income and expected amount of transfers. Here we use computer 
simulations. We compute an example and we find that the expected amount of trans-
fers behaves in a similar way to the expected number of transfers.
To use computer simulations, we need to give some value to the parameters N, cs, b,
s, and the set of a. We also need to make some assumptions about income distribu-
tion. For computational simplicity, N equals 1; i.e., each family has three members—
the grandparent, the parent, and the child.
According to the World Bank (1990), the absolute poverty threshold is 370 annual
1985 purchasing power parity adjusted US dollars. Therefore, cs is set at this level.
We assume that there is a continuum of families. Income for the first generation is
distributed according to
This function implies an income distribution similar to a Lorenz curve. In this simula-
tion we set n = 1.08, which implies a Gini coefficient of 0.35. This was the decade
average of the Gini coefficient for the industrial countries in the 1960s (Deininger and
Squire, 1996).
Recall that the discount factor between relatives equals bdij, where dij equals the
degree of consanguinity. Thus b can be considered the basic degree of altruism 
which, for this simulation, is set to 0.5. Changing the degree of altruism does not change
the results much, since the degree of altruism affects the amount of transfers only 
at very low levels of income. At higher levels of income, when the other relatives are
sufficiently rich, the total transfer received by the poor relative is the difference
between the subsistence level and his income and does not depend on the intensity 
of altruism.
According to Kremer (1997), a child’s educational attainment can be expressed as
0.39 times the educational attainment of the parents, plus 0.15 times the average edu-
cational attainment of the neighborhood in which the child grew up, plus an intercept,
I n g I gg n= +( ) Œ[ ]1 0 1, , . 
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10
parent’s income, the richer this poor relative would likely be and, thus, the smaller the
transfer.
In richer countries, with the same parameters, even at very low levels of grand-
parent’s income, because of the regression toward the mean in income, the most likely
situation is that there is just one poor relative in the family and the other two can
afford the necessary transfer for him to consume cs.Thus, the expected amount of trans-
fers decreases with the average family income (Figure 1(b)). This is the case once
income per capita reaches a certain level, lower than the mean income per capita for
lower-middle income countries; i.e., only for very poor countries is this not the case.4
Result 2. As a general rule, the expected amount of transfers decreases with the average
family income inside a country.
These first two results jointly match our first empirical regularity in section 2: within
a country, altruistically motivated transfers are much more important at low levels of
income than at high levels of income. Although not directly comparable, Figure 1(b)
looks remarkably similar to Figure 2 in Cox et al. (1996), if we ignore nonaltruistic
transfers. Recall that this figure plots the nonlinear relation between amount of trans-
fers and recipient’s income in the Philippines (a lower-middle income economy) esti-
mated by Cox and his coauthors. Below the threshold of 15,272 Filipino pesos, altruistic
transfers are operative.The flat transfer function above the threshold is consistent with
the hypothesis of nonaltruistic transfers for this group.
Income Per Capita and Transfers: A Comparison Across Countries
This subsection studies how the number and amounts of transfers vary across coun-
tries. Countries are characterized by their level of income per capita I. We maintain
income distribution constant across countries. We know that, at the same level of
income per capita, the more unequal the income distribution the larger the proportion
of families whose average income falls below the subsistence level and, therefore, the
larger the number of transfers. We want to abstract from this effect. We conclude that
our specification of altruism implies that both the number and the amounts of trans-
fers are higher the lower the per capita income of the country.
Income per capita and expected number of transfers. As long as all relatives whose
income is above the subsistence level transfer some income to those whose income is
below this level, results in this section do not depend on the solution chosen to the
public good problem. Since we have assumed that there is a continuum of families g
inside each country, for each country we integrate over g the expected number of trans-
fers inside a family to obtain the expected total number of transfers per country:
Since g Œ [0, 1], results are normalized and can be understood as expected total number
of transfers per family. The term gc denotes the family whose grandparent has an
income of exactly cs It also denotes the proportion of families whose grandparent’s
income is below the subsistence level.
For countries for which
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income per capita is so low that all members in all families in the country are poor and
so there are no transfers: ENT(I ) = 0. Otherwise, there are transfers inside the country:
ENT(I ) > 0. For countries for which
ENT(I) is strictly decreasing with the level of income per capita I—the higher the
income per capita, the larger the fraction of families rich enough not to have transfers
and, thus, the smaller the number of transfers per family. Notice that the above expres-
sion denotes a fairly low level of income per capita. Thus, ENT(I) is 0 for low levels
of income per capita, then increases with the level of income per capita, and finally
decreases, and it reaches a maximum for some relatively low level of income per capita.
If the value of s is greater than the value of cs, the first group of countries does not
exist. Now, recall that according to the World Bank calculations the absolute poverty
threshold is 370 1985 US dollars, a figure lower than the benchmark above calculated
for s ($675).
Result 3. The expected number of transfers increases with the level of income per capita
at very low levels of income. It reaches a maximum for some relatively low level of
income per capita. Finally it decreases with income per capita. That is, the number of
transfers is higher in low-income economies than in high-income economies.
This third result matches the second empirical regularity in section 2: the number of
inter-vivos transfers is larger in low-income countries than in industrialized countries.
Income per capita and expected amount of transfers. We again use computer simula-
tions. For each country, we integrate the expected amount of transfers per family over
g to obtain the expected total amount of transfers.As in the previous subsection, results
are normalized and can be understood as expected total amount of transfers per family.
We assume N = 1 for simplicity. The results are similar to those obtained above.
Figure 2 shows the relation between expected amount of transfers per family,
expressed as a percentage of per capita income, and level of per capita income.
Result 4. The expected amount of transfers, as a percentage of per capita income,
decreases with the level of income per capita.
This last result matches the third and last empirical regularity in section 2: the
amount of inter-vivos transfers, in relative terms, is larger in low-income countries than
in industrialized countries.
5. Conclusion
There is abundant evidence showing that inter-vivos transfers, either in cash or in kind,
are much more important in low-income countries than in industrialized countries.
There is also some evidence that, within a country, altruistically motivated transfers
are more important at low levels of income. We have shown that these stylized facts
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Notes
1. These two classes of transfers correspond to what sociologists call the two main societal func-
tions of families: the social placement function and the support function (see, e.g., Eichler, 1983,
pp. 106–10).
2. Biologists predict altruistic behavior not only between parents and children but also among
siblings and other close relatives. See, for instance, Dawkins (1976).
3. For an explanation of Hamilton’s rule, see Bergstrom (1996).
4. The levels of income chosen in Figure 1 correspond to the mean income per capita per 
low-income and lower-middle-income countries, respectively, in 1988, according to the World
Bank (1990).
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